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This paper provides empirical evidence on two potential costs of shared ownership of German 
affiliates abroad. First, in periods of currency crises, wholly-owned affiliates, in contrast to 
partially-owned affiliates, seem to circumvent financial constraints by accessing capital from 
their parent companies. In terms of differences in performance regarding sales of both types 
of firms, wholly-owned affiliates have a significantly better sales performance than partially-
owned affiliates in periods of crises. This finding contributes to the evidence that FDI helps in 
mitigating the negative consequences of sharp currency depreciation, and stresses that this 
effect works especially through capital inflows to wholly-owned affiliates. Second, the debt 
financing of partially-owned affiliates is less sensitive to the tax rate suggesting that partially-
owned affiliates rely less on international debt shifting than wholly-owned affiliates. This 
indicates that partially-owned affiliates are less flexible to exploit tax efficient strategies. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the debt financing behaviour of partially-owned and wholly-owned 
German affiliates abroad throughout periods of sharp currency depreciation (currency crises) 
in the host economies, and compares the differences between both types of affiliates in relying 
on international debt shifting.  
There are two main findings. First, the results indicate that wholly-owned affiliates, in 
contrast to partially-owned affiliates, can circumvent financial constraints during periods of 
sharp currency depreciation by accessing capital from their parent companies and related 
parties. The ratio of loans granted from a German parent company to total assets of a wholly-
owned affiliate increases by about 2 percentage points during years of sharp currency 
depreciation in emerging markets. Meanwhile, this ratio is lower by about 2.5 percentage 
points  in the case of partially-owned affiliates during episodes of currency crises. 
Decomposing the partial ownership structure into minority and majority-owned affiliates 
shows that the negative effect on the loan-ratio is more pronounced in the case of minority-
owned affiliates. With regards to differences in sales of both types of firms, the evidence 
suggests that sales of partially-owned affiliates decline in periods of crises, while wholly-
owned affiliates manage to keep their sales unaltered. 
Second, the results suggest that wholly-owned affiliates rely more on debt shifting 
than partially-owned affiliates. Particularly, a 10 percent increase in the corporate tax rate in 
emerging markets increases the ratio of total debt to total asset of wholly-owned affiliates by 
about 27 percentage points. However, for partially-owned and minority-owned affiliates, we 
cannot find evidence on debt shifting responses to higher tax rates. This is also true in the 
sample of affiliates operating in OECD countries suggesting that the ownership structure 
matters for tax planning and debt policy of affiliates not only in emerging markets but also in 
advanced economies. 
These findings are linked to two branches in the literature: the literature on the costs of 
shared ownership and the literature on the effects of sharp depreciations and currency crises. 
Theoretical and empirical studies that address the costs of sharing the ownership of the 
affiliate emphasise aspects such as coordination costs and the cost of shared control rights and 
technology; Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), Ramachandran (1993), and Grossman and Hart 
(1986). Furthermore, costs of shared ownership arise with regard to shifting taxable profit 
from high tax to low tax rate countries. For instance, Weichenrieder (2009) finds that a 
change in the tax rate has a larger impact on the profitability of wholly-owned than partially-
owned German affiliates. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) find a similar effect for U.S. 
affiliates. 
In this context, our results point out to two new potential costs of shared ownership. 
The first finding indicates that accommodating the financial needs of multinational affiliates 
is easier when the parent enjoys full control over the affiliate. In periods of currency crises it 
is more difficult for partially-owned affiliates to access capital from parent companies than 
wholly-owned affiliates. The second finding on debt shifting experiences suggests that 
multinational firms engage in worldwide tax planning not only with respect to profit shifting 
but also with respect to debt policy. However, the reaction of partially-owned affiliates is not 3 
 
consistent with international debt shifting. This result is a new evidence that partially-owned 
affiliates are less inclined to be shaped in a tax efficient way.
1
The effects of sharp depreciations and currency crises are examined in the literature by 
focusing on various aspects. A macroeconomic aspect includes for example studies that 
investigate the response of macroeconomic variables such as output and the current account to 
currency depreciations; Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2007). A microeconomic aspect 
concentrates on financial issues such as the foreign exchange exposure of the firm and 
corporate financial policies around periods of sharp depreciation; Bris and Koskinen (2002), 
Bris, Koskinen, and Pons (2004). There are recent attempts, to which this paper belongs, to 
use data at the firm level to provide microeconomic evidence on ideas that have 
macroeconomic interpretations. For example, Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) compare the 
reaction of U.S. affiliates with local firms to currency depreciations, and conclude that U.S. 
affiliates, in contrast to local firms, expand their activities after sharp depreciations. This 
finding supports the idea that foreign direct investment (FDI) tends to mitigate the negative 
effect of a sharp depreciation or the severity of a currency crises. As an explanation for their 
finding, Desai et al.  (2008) provide evidence for the hypothesis that foreign affiliates 
overcome financial constraints through internal capital markets with the parent companies. 
These results are connected to the rich literature on the positive effects of FDI on host 




In conjunction with this literature, our results contribute to the evidence that FDI helps 
in mitigating the negative consequences of sharp currency depreciations. Moreover, the 
results put forth that the effect works especially through inflows of loans from parent 
companies and related parties to wholly-owned affiliates. This is an indication of a negative 
effect of restricting foreign ownership of the affiliates by the law of the host economy. 
  Alvarez and Görg (2007) consider a distinct but related issue of 
employment response of multinational subsidiaries and local firms in a period of economic 
slowdown in Chile, and find no evidence on differential reactions between both types of 
firms. 
This paper proceeds as follows: In section (2), we describe the data, identify episodes 
of sharp currency depreciation and provide descriptive statistics. We present our empirical 
results in section (3) and conclude in Section (4). 
 
2.  Data, Depreciation Episodes and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1  Data and Depreciation Episodes 
This study employs the Deutsche Bundesbank MiDi dataset on the German outbound FDI. 
This firm-level dataset contains information on private, publicly traded and government-
owned German affiliates abroad. The foreign trade and payments regulation oblige all 
German firms investing abroad and satisfying the reporting requirements to report several key 
                                                           
1 While the focus in this paper is to compare differences between both types of affiliates, other studies examine 
the determinants of the ownership decision. For example, Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2009) stress the role of firm 
productivity in the ownership decision and provide evidence from Japanese multinational firms. Kesternich and 
Schnitzer (2009) find that the ownership share depends negatively on political risks. 
2 See Smeets (2009) and Görg and Greenaway (2004) for a survey. 4 
 
balance sheet items of their affiliates abroad. We concentrate on firms in manufacturing 
industries and exclude banks, financial and non-profit institutions. To correct for changes in 
the reporting requirements for German investors during the sample period, we drop all 
affiliates that are characterised by a total balance sheet of less than five million euro and 
discard affiliates that do not exist for at least three consecutive years.
3
Since a prime interest in this paper is the impact of currency crises on the debt 
behaviour of affiliates, a sample of emerging markets is required. Also, in examining the 
power of taxation in explaining the debt policy of affiliates, it is constructive to distinguish 
between those affiliates located in OECD countries and those in emerging markets. Therefore, 
we obtain two sub-samples by restricting the full sample to either include only emerging 
markets or only OECD countries. We identify emerging markets as those economies that are 
classified as middle income economies by the World Bank and for which we have 
information on German affiliates. Hence, the sample of emerging markets contains 
observations on 28,178 German affiliates in 31 countries (on average 2,562 affiliates per year) 
whereas the OECD sample contains observations on 87,099 German affiliates. Both sub-
samples, like the full sample, span from 1996 to 2006. 
 The final full sample 
spans from 1996 to 2006  and contains observations on 106,809 German affiliates in 55 
countries (on average 9,710 affiliates per year). 
Data on statutory corporate income tax rates have been taken from Mintz and 
Weichenrieder  (forthcoming), PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG.  The source of 
macroeconomic variables is the International Financial Statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund. In computing the nominal exchange rates between the Euro and the national 
currencies for the period before 1999, we employ the exchange rate of the ECU (European 
Currency Unit) vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark. The real exchange rate between the Euro and the 
currency of the host economy is obtained by deflating the nominal rate by the ratio of the 
German producer price index to the producer price index of the host economy.
4




𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = � 
1
0
 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 2 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛)
 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 
   (1) 
The subscripts n and t are a country and a time index respectively. The depreciation 
dummy is equal to one if the change in the real exchange rate (RER) is greater than or equal 
to its country mean times double its standard deviation STD (period 1990-2007). Otherwise, 
the depreciation dummy takes the value zero. This method is in line with the identification 
methods used in the literature on currency crises.
5
 
 It captures well known years of sharp 
currency depreciation such as 1998 in Russia, 1999 in Brazil and 2002 in Argentina. The 
appendix displays a list of the identified years of depreciation.  
 
 
                                                           
3 See Lipponer (2008) for details on the reporting requirements and the MiDi dataset. 
4 The producer price index is not available for five countries. In these cases, we use the consumer price index. 
5 See Laeven and Valencia (2008), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), and Frankel and Rose (1996). 5 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1996 -2006 
  Wholly-owned Affiliates 
  All countries  Emerging markets  OECD countries 
Number of affiliates  80106  18161  67937 
Percent  75%  64.5%  78 
  mean  st. deviation  mean  st. deviation  mean  st. deviation  
Total debt ratio  0.53  0.29  0.52  0.29  0.53  0.29 
Debt from parent ratio  0.13  0.21  0.14  0.21  0.13  0.21 
Log of sales  8.90  3.54  9.24  2.81  8.90  3.54 
Log of employment  4.5  1.47  4.8  1.41  4.5  1.61 
Corporate tax rate  0.33  0.06  0.28  0.06  0.34  0.06 
             
  Partially-owned Affiliates 
  All countries  Emerging markets  OECD countries 
Number of affiliates  26703  10017  19162 
Percent  25%  35.5%  22% 
  mean  st. deviation  mean  st. deviation  mean  st. deviation 
Total debt ratio  0.51  0.29  0.49  0.28  0.52  0.29 
Debt from parent ratio  0.06  0.14  0.06  0.14  0.05  0.14 
Log of sales  8.83  3.42  9.22  2.72  8.65  3.69 
Log of employment  4.7  1.59  5.2  1.41  4.4  1.61 
Corporate tax rate  0.32  0.06  0.30  0.06  0.35  0.06 
 
2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
The degree of ownership of an affiliate is computed in the MiDi dataset based upon the actual 
share of the parent firm in nominal capital of the affiliate. If this share is 100 percent, we 
consider the affiliate to be wholly-owned. Otherwise, the affiliate is considered to be partially-
owned. In our regression analysis, we make a further distinction among partially-owned 
affiliates between minority-owned, characterised by a participation share of less than 50 
percent, and majority-owned, characterised by a participation share of greater than 50 percent 
but less than 100 percent. 
Table (1) displays the number of affiliates and summary statistics of variables used in 
our econometric analysis. Considering the sample of all countries, 75 percent of the affiliates 
are wholly-owned while 25 percent are partially-owned. In the sample of emerging markets, 
about 64.5 percent of the affiliates are wholly-owned while 35.5 percent are partially-owned. 
In OECD countries partially-owned affiliates constitute about 22 percent of total affiliates. 
Further, table (1) reveals that with respect to the ratio of total debt or sales there are no 
substantial differences between both types of affiliates or between affiliates across countries.
6
                                                           
6 We correct for outliers by excluding affiliates characterised by a total debt ratio above the 98
th percentile. These 
are observations with extreme values of negative equity. 
    
However, the ratio of loans from parent companies tends to be lower for partially-owned 
affiliates than for wholly-owned affiliates. The average statutory corporate tax rates faced by 
both types of firms are almost identical. 6 
 
German multinational firms  are increasingly relying on establishing wholly-owned 
affiliates to carry out their operations abroad rather than partially-owned affiliates. 
Considering the entire sample, panel (a) of figure (1) shows that the percentage of wholly-
owned affiliates has increased from 70 percent in 1996 to about 80 percent in 2006.
7
Figure (2) illustrates the pattern of wholly vs. partially-owned affiliates across sectors. 
One important massage from figure (2) is that we do not observe a pattern of clustering of 
partially-owned affiliates only in one sector and wholly-owned affiliates only in another 
sector. In the sample including all countries, the percentage of partially-owned affiliates is 
between 22 to 30 percent in all sectors. One exception is the wholesale trade sector. In 
emerging markets the percentage of partially-owned affiliates across sectors is between 37 
and 48 percent (panel b) whereas it is lower in OECD countries (panel c). 
 This 
pattern is consistent with that reported in Desai et al. (2004) for U.S. firms. Panels (b) and (c) 
of figure (1) demonstrate that this pattern is observed in emerging markets and in OECD 
countries. The percentage of partially-owned affiliates has decreased from about 46 percent in 
1996 to 30 percent in 2006 in emerging markets (panel b) and from 25 percent in 1996 to 18 
percent in 2006 in OECD countries (panel c). 
 
                                                           
7 Since the key point to be made is the access of affiliates to loans from their parent companies in Germany, we 
consider affiliates that are owned by two or more German parents as wholly-owned affiliates. 7 
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.  Empirical Results 
3.1  Financing Multinational Affiliates During Periods of Sharp Currency 
Depreciations 
Sharp currency depreciations affect firms in many ways. A depreciation of the currency of the 
host economy makes the products of exporting firms more competitive in the international 
markets supporting exports.
8 Hence, exporting firms, whether domestic or multinational, may 
seek to obtain additional debt finance for expansion. Meanwhile, importing firms may not be 
able to fully pass through the decrease in the value of the domestic currency to domestic 
prices leading to financial unease and a need for funds.
9
                                                           
8 Forbes (2002) compares the performance of firms in economies that did not experience depreciation episodes 
with those located in economies that did experience depreciations without distinguishing between multinational 
and domestic firms. The results suggest that particularly firms with foreign sales exposure outperform those with 
low foreign sales exposure. 
  At the same time, many sharp 
depreciations, or currency crises, are associated with domestic credit crunches and banking 
crises causing difficulties in accessing capital from the host market. This "twin crisis" 
phenomenon is stressed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Also, currency depreciation 
increases the nominal value of debt dominated in foreign currency, which raises financial 
9 See Campa and Goldberg (2005) for empirical evidence and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a literature 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Wholly-owned  Partially-owned10 
 
leverage and limits the ability to obtain loans. The role of this balance sheet effect is 
considered, for example, by Krugman (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
10
Thus, firms' access to capital from the host economy can be limited during periods of 
sharp currency depreciation. Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008) emphasise that multinational 
firms circumvent such financial constraints by receiving capital from their parent companies. 
The question we ask here is: do all multinational affiliates benefit from such an effect? The 
answer turned out to be no; only wholly-owned affiliates do. During periods of currency 
crises, partially-owned German affiliates do not seem to receive extra loans from their parent 
companies.  Theoretically,  in the context of international tax planning Schindler and 
Schjelderup (2008) show that  partially-owned affiliates  are less effective in using intra-
company loans to implement a tax efficient strategy than wholly-owned affiliates. The reason 
is that the benefits are shared with all owners even though some co-owners did not contribute 
to the funding of the plan. The same reasoning applies to periods of crises. 
 
Empirically, we employ the following baseline specification: 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝗼𝗼 + 𝗽𝗽1�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘� + 𝗽𝗽2�𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘� 
                      +𝖪𝖪𝖪𝖪𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝗈𝗈𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡  (2) 
 
where the subscript k denotes each firm, n is a subscript for each country, and t is a 
subscript for each year. The dependent variable, debt, is either the ratio of debt from parent 
companies and related parties in Germany to total asset or the total-debt ratio of the affiliate. 
crisis is a dummy that is equal to one if the host economy experiences a sharp real currency 
depreciation (currency crisis) in that year as identified in equation (1) in section 2.1. partially 
is a dummy that is equal to one if the affiliate is partially owned and zero otherwise. tax is the 
statutory corporate income tax rate of the host economy. 𝖪𝖪𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡  is a vector of additional 
controls with associated vector of coefficients 𝖪𝖪. 𝗈𝗈𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 is a set of country-year fixed effects that 
control for all unobserved country-year specific macroeconomic factors. 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 is an error term. 
All standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country-year level. As we are interested 
in the effects of currency crises, the empirical analysis in this section is concentrated on 
emerging markets. 
In this framework, since a currency crisis is a country-year event the identification 
strategy is based on interaction terms between the ownership dummy (a time invariant firm-
specific variable) and time variant country-specific variables. Our main interest is the 
coefficient on the interaction term between the crisis dummy and the partially-owned dummy 
𝗽𝗽1, which we expect to be negative. Further, one important factor in explaining the debt 
behaviour of multinational affiliates is the tax rate. Since the interest payments on debt can be 
deducted from taxes, firms rely more on debt financing than equity in an environment of high 
taxes. Empirical evidence on such international debt shifting strategies is provided for 
example by Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008) on European firms, (and) Jog and Tang 
                                                           
10 Empirically, Aguiar (2005) finds that firms with heavy exposure to short run foreign currency debt before the 
Mexican devaluation of the peso crisis in 1994 experience relatively low levels of post-devaluation investment. 
Bleakley and Cowan (2008) examine firms in five Latin American countries and find no support that those firms 
holding more dollar debt invest less than firms indebted in local currency. 11 
 
(2001) on firms operating in Canada. Multinational affiliates can seek a tax shelter especially 
through loans from their parent companies. Our aim here is to distinguish between 
multinational affiliates based on the ownership structure. Do partially-owned affiliates exploit 
this strategy of debt shifting less than wholly-owned affiliates? If the estimated sign of 𝗽𝗽2 is 
negative then the answer is yes. 
Table (2) presents the estimation results. In columns (1) to (5) the dependent variable 
is the ratio of debt from parent companies and related parties in Germany to total assets (loan-
ratio). In column (1), the estimated 𝗽𝗽1 is negative and significant suggesting that the loan-ratio 
of a partially-owned affiliate is lower than that of a wholly-owned affiliate by 2.1 percentage 
points in a year of a currency crisis. 
In column (2), we introduce the partially-owned dummy and interaction terms between 
the partially-owned dummy and a vector of controls including the tax rate, GDP, domestic 
credits to private sector as percent of GDP, the interest rate in the host economy, and sales of 
the affiliates. The coefficient on the interaction term between the depreciation dummy and the 
partially-owned dummy 𝗽𝗽1 is as expected negative and significant. The estimated coefficient 
on the interaction term between the partially-owned dummy and the tax rate 𝗽𝗽2  is also 
significant and negative (-0.07). This indicates that partially-owned affiliates are less likely to 
employ a tax efficient loan policy. In section 3.3, we will scrutinise whether or not this 
finding can be maintained in a sample of OECD countries.  
A partial ownership structure can be decomposed into minority-owned and majority-
owned affiliates. In column (3), we introduce dummies capturing this decomposition and 
multiply these dummies with the crisis  dummy and the tax rate. Both, the estimated 
coefficient on the variable "minority-owned*crisis" (-0.041) and on the variable "majority-
owned*crisis" (-0.028) are negative and significant. The coefficient on "minority-
owned*crisis" in absolute value is larger though indicating that minority-owned affiliates are 
particularly less inclined to increase their ratios of loans from the parent firm in periods of 
crises. Further, the evidence suggests that the loan ratio of minority-owned affiliates is not 
increasing in the tax rate as indicated by an estimated coefficient of -0.112. 
As a robustness check, instead of country-year fixed effects we employ in columns (4) 
and (5) of table (2) country, year and industry fixed effects. This allows us to controls for 
potential characteristics that are unique to a certain economic sector within a country and 
year. In this setup, we can introduce time variant country-specific variables including the 
crisis dummy without interaction. The estimated coefficient on the crisis dummy is positive 
and significant suggesting that in a year of currency crisis the loan-ratio of a wholly-owned 
affiliate increases by 2 percentage points. In contrast, the estimated 𝗽𝗽1 is as expected negative 
indicating that the increase in loan-ratio is only a feature of the loan-ratio of wholly-owned 
affiliates but not of partially-owned affiliates. According to the international debt shifting 
hypothesis the loan-ratio is expected to positively depend on the tax rate; the higher the tax 
rate the higher the benefits from financing through loans. Indeed, the estimated coefficient on 
the tax rate is positive and significant. However, the estimated sign of 𝗽𝗽2  is negative 
suggesting that partially-owned affiliates are less sensitive to the tax rate than wholly-owned 
affiliates. 
As a further robustness check, column (5) includes the same set of fixed effects as in 
column (4) but in addition it contains interaction terms between the crisis dummy and all 12 
 
control variables. The results are robust. 𝗽𝗽1 and 𝗽𝗽2 maintain their sign and significance while 
most estimated coefficients on these interaction terms are insignificant at a convenient level. 
The ratio of credits to the private sector to GDP captures the liquidity of the financial market 
of the host economy. Intuitively, high liquidity in the financial market of the host economy 
may negatively affect the loan-ratio. Our estimates, however, are positive and significant 
rejecting this intuition. German affiliates seem not to rely extensively on the capital market of 
the host economy. Therefore, in the time of a credit boom in the host economy they may 
demand more loans from their parents to keep up with local competitors.
11
Thus far, we have established that wholly-owned affiliates seem to receive more loans 
from their parents than partially-owned affiliates during periods of sharp real currency 
depreciation. An important question that arises is what happens to the total debt ratio of both 
types of affiliates during periods of sharp currency depreciation? In columns (1) to (5) of table 
(3), we estimate the same set of specifications as in columns (1) to (5) of table (2) but use the 
total debt ratio as the dependent variable. In all specifications, the total debt ratio of partially-
owned affiliates decreases in years of crises. With reference to columns (1) to (5) of table (2), 
most of this decrease is attributed to the decrease in loans from the parent firm and related 
parties. In the case of wholly-owned affiliates however, the reference group in specification 
(4) of table (3) for example, the total debt ratio increases during episodes of currency crises by 
a magnitude of 2.8 percentage points. Further, with regard to the total debt ratio, the estimates 
suggest that minority-owned affiliates seem to be particular financially less flexible in years 
of currency rises as indicated by the coefficient  of  -0.052 in column (3). The negative 
coefficients on the partially-owned dummy reported in specifications (1), (2), (4) and (5) 
suggest that partially-owned affiliates are less indebted than wholly-owned affiliates. 
Furthermore, unlike in the case of the intra-company loan ratio, the effect of the tax rate on 
the total debt ratio is insignificant pointing out that tax sheltering through debt policy of 
multinational firms is especially achieved through loans from the parent company and 
affiliated parties. 
 Concerning the 
interest  rate  of  the  host  economy,  it  is  insignificant  in specification 4.  However,  in 
specification 5,  the  interest  rate  is  positive  indicating  that high interest  rate in the host 
economy leads to a higher loan-ratio from the parent firm.  
In sum, the results presented in this section point out to two potential costs of shared 
ownership. First, wholly-owned affiliates seem to be financially more flexible to manage 
crises while the loan ratio of partially-owned affiliates decreases in periods of crises. Second, 
consistent with a tax efficient strategy, the intra-company loan policy of wholly-owned 
affiliates is sensitive to the  tax rate of the host economy contrary to the loan  policy of 
partially-owned affiliates. 
   
                                                           
11 Some studies consider the other side of the issue, namely, the effects of FDI on the host market financial 
development. See for example Harrison and McMillan (2003). 13 
 
Table 2: Currency crises and intra-company financing 
Dependent variable:  Debt to enterprises in 
Germany/ total asset   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Crisis        0.020
b  0.017
c 
        (.008)  (.10) 
Partially-owned*crisis  -0.025
c  -0.028
b    -0.21
b  -0.026
b 
  (.014)  (.035)    (.011)  (.011) 
Partially owned   -0.07
a  -0.07    -0.08  -0.06 
  (.002)  (.05)    (.052)  (.05) 
Partially-owned*tax rate     -0-070
b    -0.086
b  -0.07
b 
    (.03)    (.033)  (.03) 
Partially-owned*credit/GDP    0.010
c    0.012
b  0.12
b 
    (.000)    (.006)  (.006) 
Partially-owned*GDP    0.001    0.002  0.001 
    (.002)    (.002)  (.002) 




    (.0008)    (.0007)  (.00) 
Partially-owned*interest    0.018    0.017  0.022 
    (.01)    (.018)  (.018) 
Minority-owned*crisis      -0.041
a     
      (.01)     
Majority-owned*crisis      -0.028
c     
      (.01)     
Minority-owned      -0.10
c     
      (.05)     
Majority-owned      -0.12
c     
      (.06)     
Minority-owned*tax rate      -0.112
b     
      (.04)     
Majority-owned*tax rate      0.001     
      (.04)     
Minority-owned*credit/GDP      0.017
c     
      (.008)     
Minority-owned*GDP      0.001     
      (.002)     
Minority-owned*sales      -0.000     
      (.000)     
Minority-owned*interest      0.010     
      (.018)     
Majority-owned*credit/GDP      0.026
a     
      (.008)     
Majority-owned*GDP      0.004     
      (.003)     
Majority-owned*sales      -0.003
b     
      (.001)     
Majority-owned*interest      0.033
c     
      (.017)     
Tax rate        0.27
a  2.05
a 
        (.04)  (.75) 
Credit/GDP        0.35
a  0.04 
        (.012)  (.04) 
GDP        -0.02
a  -0.06
a 
        (.007)  (.01) 
Interest rate        0.01  0.20
a 
        (.01)  (.08) 





    (.0007)  (.0007)  (.007)  (.001) 
Crisis *tax rate          0.13 
          (.16) 
Crisis *credit/GDP          -0.01
b 
          (.004) 
Crisis *sales          -0.001 
          (.002) 
Crisis *interest rate          0.019 
          (.018) 
           14 
 
Country-year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Country fixed effects   No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  No   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  28178  27821  28178  27821  27821 
Adjust R
2  0.05  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Note: 
a indicates significance at 1%,
 b indicates significance at 5%, and 
c indicates significance at the 10% level. Depreciation 
is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the year is identified as a currency crisis year; see section 2.1. Tax rate is the statutory 
corporate income tax rate. Partially-owned is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the affiliate is not entirely-owned by a German 
parent company. Minority-owned and majority-owned are dummies equal to 1 if the affiliate is minority-owned and majority-
owned respectively. For a detailed description of the data on German multinational affiliates see section 2. Credit/GDP is the 




Table 3: Currency crises and total debt 
Dependent variable:  total debt/ total asset 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Crisis        0.028
a  0.01 
        (.01)  (.20) 
Partially-owned*crisis  -0.031
c  -0.028
c    -0.026
c  -0.31
b 
  (.01)  (.015)    (.015)  (.08) 
Partially owned   -0.024
a  -0.40
a    -0.38
a  -0.38
a 
  (.004)  (.008)    (.08)  (.08) 
Partially-owned*tax rate     0.04    0.010  0.03 
    (.05)    (.06)  (.06) 
Partially-owned*credit/GDP    0.01    0.01  0.01 
    (.009)    (.008)  (.008) 
Partially-owned*GDP    0.01
a    0.019
a  0.01
a 
    (.004)    (.004)  (.004) 
Partially-owned*sales    0.00    0.00  0.00 
    (.00)    (.00)  (.00) 
Partially-owned*interest    -0.024    -0.014  -0.013 
    (.02)    (.02)  (.02) 
Minority-owned*crisis      -0.054
a     
      (.02)     
Majority-owned*crisis      0.01     
      (.01)     
Minority-owned      -1.04
a     
      (.11)     
Majority-owned      -0.20
b     
      (.09)     
Minority-owned*tax rate      0.14     
      (.09)     
Majority-owned*tax rate      0.00     
      (.07)     
Minority-owned*credit/GDP      0.10
a     
      (.01)     
Minority-owned*GDP      0.04
a     
      (.00)     
Minority-owned*sales      0.003
c     
      (.00)     
Minority-owned*interest      -0.03     
      (.030)     
Majority-owned*credit/GDP      0.01     
      (.01)     
Majority-owned*GDP      0.01
a     
      (.005)     
Majority-owned*sales      -0.006
a     
      (.002)     
Majority-owned*interest      -0.04
c     
      (.02)     15 
 
Tax rate        0.23
a  -0.95 
        (.08)  (1.4) 
Credit/GDP        0.05
b  -0.14
c 
        (.02)  (.08) 
GDP        -0.07
a  -0.08
a 
        (.01)  (.02) 
Interest rate        -0.03  0.23 
        (.03)  (.18) 
Sales    0.007
a  0.007
a  0.007
a  -0.003 
    (.00)  (.00)  (.001)  (.004) 
Crisis *tax rate          -0.021 
          (.36) 
Crisis *credit/GDP          0.002 
          (.009) 
Crisis *sales          0.001 
          (.004) 
Crisis *interest rate          0.01 
          (.04) 
           
Country-year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Country fixed effects   No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  No   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  28178  27821  27821  27821  27821 
Adjust R
2  0.05  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.13 
Note: 
a indicates significance at 1%,
 b indicates significance at 5%, and 
c indicates significance at the 10% level. Depreciation 
is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the year is identified as a currency crisis year; see section 2.1. Tax rate is the statutory 
corporate income tax rate. Partially-owned is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the affiliate is not entirely-owned by a German 
parent company. Minority-owned and majority-owned are dummies equal to 1 if the affiliate is minority-owned and majority-
owned respectively. For a detailed description of the data on German multinational affiliates see section 2. Credit/GDP is the 
ratio of credit to private sector to GDP. Standard errors reported in brackets are robust corrected for clustering at the country-
year level. 
 
3.2  Performance of multinational affiliates during periods of sharp 
currency depreciation  
The financial flexibility of multinational affiliates may affect their performance during 
periods of currency crises. In this section, we consider the question: can we observe 
differences in performance of both types of affiliates during currency crises? The answer 
seems to depend on what do we mean by performance. We examine two measures of 
performance, sales growth and employment growth, within a similar empirical specification to 
the one presented in equation (2): 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝗼𝗼 + 𝗿𝗿�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘� + 𝖽𝖽𝖽𝖽𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝗈𝗈𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡  (3) 
 
where growth is either sales growth or employment growth of the affiliate and is 
measured as annual change. 𝖽𝖽 is the vector of coefficients corresponding to the controls in 
𝖽𝖽𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡. 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 is an error term. In this specification, the coefficient 𝗿𝗿 is our main interest. A 
negative 𝗿𝗿 would indicate a decline in the performance of partially-owned affiliates in years 
of crises. 
Table (4) displays the results. In terms of sales growth, columns (1) to (4), the results 
suggest that wholly-owned affiliates manage to keep their sales unchanged during periods of 
currency crises. The coefficient on the interaction term between the partially-owned dummy 16 
 
and the crisis dummy (𝗿𝗿) is negative and significant indicating that sales of partially-owned 
affiliates decline during currency crises. For example, the coefficient of -0.27 in column (1) 
indicates that partially-owned affiliates’  sales growth in a year of crisis is 27 percentage 
points lower than wholly-owned affiliates’ sales growth. While in columns (1) and (2) we use 
country-year fixed effects, as a robustness check, we account for unobserved heterogeneity of 
affiliates by using in column (3) a set of country-industry fixed effects and in column (4) a set 
of affiliates and year fixed effects. The coefficient on the crisis dummy, although negative, is 
insignificant indicating that wholly-owned affiliates manage to keep their sales growth 
unaltered  in episodes of sharp currency depreciations. However, 𝗿𝗿  remains negative and 
significant. 
If performance is considered in terms of consequences for the employment of the 
affiliate, in all specifications, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between the 
partially-owned dummy and the crisis dummy is insignificant. Additionally, the results in 
columns (7) to (8) in table (3) indicate a decrease in the number of employees in crises 
periods of about 3 percentage points regardless of the ownership structure of the affiliate. This 
is not necessarily surprising. Domestic co-owners of partially-owned affiliates in emerging 
markets may be keen on a cautious rather than massive reduction in employment for social 
and political reasons. Also, we do not have details of the type of employment  contracts 
prevailing across types of firms. It is possible that the cost of labour is higher for wholly-
owned multinational affiliates because they offer more insurance or higher wages etc. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to compare the reactions of employment of domestic firms and 
employment of multinational affiliates during crises since data on domestic firms are not 
available. For instance, it is possible that domestic firms decrease employment by more than 
multinational affiliates do. Alvarez and Görg (2007) consider the employment response of 
multinational subsidiaries and local firms in a period of economic slowdown in Chile, and 
find no evidence on differential reactions between both types of firms. 
   17 
 
 
Table 4: Currency crises and firm performance 
Dependent variable:  sales growth    employment growth   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Crisis      -0.02  -0.09      -0.038
b  -0.032
c 
      (.09)  (.07)      (.014)  (.018) 




c  -0.002  -0.005  -0.014  -0.001 
  (.08)  (.08)  (.07)  (.08)  (.03)  (.03)  (.02)  (.02) 
Partially-owned  -0.01
a  -0.39
a  -0.06    -0.03  -0.13
b  -0.19
a   
  (.02)  (.18)  (.20)    (.008)  (.06)  (.007)   









  (.01)  (.01)  (.01)  (.02)  (.003)  (.00)  (.006)  (.00) 





a  0.012  0.017
a  0.01 
  (.008)  (.009)  (.01)  (.02)  (.002)  (.02)  (.003)  (.008) 
Lag employment          0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00 
          (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00) 




c  -0.03    0.013
b  -0.005  -0.008 
    (.02)  (.02)  (.02)    (.006)  (.006)  (.01) 




a  0.04 
  -0.002  0.022
a  0.026
a 
    (.01)  (.01)  (.02)    (.005)  (.006)  (.008) 
Partially-owned *lag 
employment 
          0.00  0.00  0.00 
            (.00)  (.00)  (.00) 
Partially-owned 
*economic growth 
  0.45  0.40  0.84    -0.11  0.008  0.10 
    (.62)  (.56)  (.68)    (.25)  (.19)  (.21) 
Partially-owned 
*inflation  rate 
  0.07
c  0.07
a  -0.04    0.007  -0.003  -0.001 
    (.04)  (.02)  (.03)    (.011)  (.006)  (.01) 
Economic growth      1.41
a  0.16
c      0.38
a  0.30
c 
      (.38)  (.51)      (.14)  (.17) 
Inflation  rate      -0.006  -0.02
b      0.010  0.006 
      (.008)  (.01)      (.007)  (.006) 
                 
Country-year fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Country-sector fixed 
effects 
No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Firm fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Year fixed effects   No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Number of observations  23187  23187  23187  23187  21735  21735  21735  21735 
Adjusted R²  0.19  0.19  0.30  0.47  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.12 
Note: 
a indicates significance at 1%, 
b indicates significance at 5%, and 
c indicates significance at the 10% level. Crisis is 
a dummy that is equal to 1 if the year is identified as a currency crisis year; see section 2.1. Tax rate is the statutory 
corporate income tax rate. Partially-owned is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the affiliate is not entirely-owned by a 
German parent company. Minority-owned and majority-owned are dummies equal to 1 if the affiliate is minority-owned 
and majority-owned respectively. For a detailed description of the data on German multinational affiliates see section 2. 





3.3  International Debt Shifting: OECD Countries 
The previous sections have highlighted the lower financial flexibility of partially-owned 
compared to wholly-owned affiliates operating in emerging markets. This lower flexibility 
prevailed in reaction to currency crises as well as in response to different tax incentives. One 
may ask the question:  Do costs of shared ownership of affiliates arise only in emerging 
markets? Clearly, due to the absence of currency crises in major developed countries during 
the period 1996-2006 we cannot check whether the differential flexibility to currency 
depreciations carries over to affiliates located in OECD countries. It is possible, however, to 
compare affiliates' responses to tax rate differences across emerging and more developed 
countries. This is the objective of the present section. From a theoretical point of view, 
Schindler and Schjelderup (2008) put forward a model according to which the benefits of an 
international debt shifting tax plan are shared with all owners even though some co-owners 
did not contribute to the funding of the plan. Such externalities complicate the implementation 
of a tax efficient strategy. Thus, joint ventures in this model are less effective in tax planning 
than wholly-owned affiliates. As we will show, empirically  ownership of affiliates in 
emerging and more affluent economies has a very similar effect. Whether located in OECD 
countries or emerging markets, our empirical evidence suggest that partially-owned affiliates 
react less sensitively to tax rate differences than wholly-owned affiliates. 
We employ in this section a similar empirical approach to the one used in section 3.1 
but on the entire sample and on the sample of OECD countries.
12 Table (5) presents the 
results. The dependent variable is the ratio of debt to the parent company and related parties to 
total assets, which is expected to positively depend on the tax rate only in the case of wholly-
owned affiliates.
13
The upshot of the analysis presented in this section is that with regard to the reaction of intra-
company loan-ratio to the tax rate there seem to be no differences between affiliates operating 
in  emerging markets and affiliates operating in OECD  economies.  Wholly-owned 
multinational affiliates shift financing from equity to intra-company loans in high tax 
 All specifications include a vector of controls containing interaction terms 
between controls and the ownership dummy(s). The controls are the logarithm of the GDP, 
the interest rate in the host economy and the logarithm of sales of affiliates (results are not 
reported). All reported standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country-year level. 
The sample in columns (1) to (4) contains all countries. We restrain the sample in columns (5) 
to (8) to include only OECD countries. The variable partially-owned*tax rate is estimated to 
have a negative sign in both samples in all specifications. Considering the sample of all 
countries, in column (3) for example, the coefficient on the tax rate is positive and significant 
at the 1 percent level suggesting that a 10 percent increase in the tax rate increases the intra-
company loan ratio of wholly-owned affiliates by 15 percentage points. Very similar 
coefficients in terms of the sign and the magnitude are found for the sample of OECD 
countries; columns (6) and (7). 
                                                           
12 In a related application, Mintz and Weichenrieder (forthcoming, chapter five) study the "indirect" determinants 
of outbound German FDI by splitting the sample into a wholly-owned sample and a partially-owned sample 
without distinguishing between OECD and emerging markets. We prefer here to include a dummy variable 
capturing the ownership structure, which enables us to directly compare the behaviours  of both types of 
affiliates. 
13 Lehmann, Sayek, and Kang (2004) examine the role of borrowing from the capital market of the host 
economy. 19 
 
countries in order to benefit from the deduction of interest payments from the tax bill. Overall, 
the evidence shows that wholly-owned affiliates rely more on international debt shifting than 
partially-owned affiliates. 
 
Table 5: Taxes and intra-company financing 
  Dependent variable: debt to enterprises in Germany / total asset 
  All countries    OECD countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)    (8) 












   































     
Minority-owned*tax rate        -0.09
a 
(.02) 
          -0.22
a 
(.03) 
Majority-owned*tax rate        -0.008 
(.02) 
          -0.4 
(.03) 
Minority-owned        -0.09
a 
(.01) 
          -0.35
a 
(.05) 
Majority-owned        -0.08
a 
(.01) 
          -0.25
a 
(.04) 
Country-year fixed effects  Yes  No  No  Yes    Yes  No  No    Yes 
Country-industry fixed effects  No  Yes  No  No    No  Yes  No    No 
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  No    No  Yes  Yes    No 
Firm fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No    No  No  Yes    No 
Number of observations  106809  106809  106809  106809    87099  87099  87099    87099 
Adjusted R²  0.07  0.10  0.63  0.03    0.03  0.10  0.64    0.03 
Note: 
a indicates significance at 1%, 
b indicates significance at 5%, and 
c indicates significance at the 10% level. Tax 
rate is the statutory corporate income tax rate. Partially-owned is a dummy equals to 1 if the affiliate is not entirely-
owned by a German parent company. Minority-owned and majority-owned are dummies equal to 1 if the affiliate is 
minority-owned and majority-owned respectively. All specifications include a vector of controls and/or interaction 
terms between controls and the ownership dummy(s). The controls are the logarithm of the GDP, the interest rate in the 
host economy and the logarithm of sales of affiliates. For a detailed description of the data on German multinational 
affiliates see section 2. Standard errors reported in brackets are robust corrected for clustering at the country-year level. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The empirical results documented in this paper are related to various strands in the literature. 
We contribute to the literature on the cost of shared ownership by considering the debt 
behaviour of German affiliates abroad and providing evidence on two sorts of potential costs 
of shared ownership. First, during periods of sharp currency depreciation the loan-ratio of 20 
 
wholly-owned affiliates increase. However, partially-owned affiliates, especially minority-
owned affiliates, are less likely to take advantage of their parent companies during periods of 
sharp currency depreciation. This finding has a potential relevance for the macroeconomic 
stabilisation effect of FDI in crises periods. It suggests that the effect works especially 
through FDI loans to wholly-owned affiliates and questions a stabilising role of FDI loans to 
minority-owned multinational firms. Second, wholly-owned affiliates rely more on 
international debt shifting than partially-owned affiliates. This indicates that partially-owned 
multinational affiliates are restrained from fully exploiting a tax minimising strategy. While 
the lower financial flexibility of partially-owned affiliates during currency crises could only 
be tested for a set of emerging countries, the analysis of tax effects has shown that there are 
no systematic differences between affiliates in emerging markets and OECD countries. In 
both sets of countries, ownership is similarly important. 
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Appendix: Depreciation Dates 
Country  Depreciation Years 
Argentina  2002 
Brazil  1999 
Bulgaria  1999 
Chile  none 
China  none 
Colombia  1999 
Croatia  1997, 1999 
Egypt  2003 
Hong Kong  none 
India  none 
Indonesia  1998 
Korea  1998 
Latvia  none 
Lithuania  none 
Malaysia  none 
Mexico  2003 
Morocco  none 
Peru  1999 
Philippines  1998 
Poland  1999 
Romania  1999 
Russia  1999 
Singapore  none 
South Africa  2000 
Taiwan  none 
Thailand  1997 
Tunisia  1997 
Turkey  none 
Ukraine  1999 
Uruguay  none 
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